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     1 Introduction
The literature about mechanism design in multi-agent environments relies widely on
the notion of Bayesian-Nash (BN hereafter) implementation. This notion rests on im-
portant common knowledge assumptions, namely those regarding one agent￿ s probability
assessment about the other agents￿private information. In practice, this may raise dif-
￿culties. Indeed, as evidenced by Wilson (1987) and rea¢ rmed thereafter by several
authors hinging on the so-called Wilson Doctrine, BN incentive compatible mechanisms
may yield unsatisfactory outcomes if the common knowledge hypotheses on which they
stand are actually false.
One possibility for a principal to avoid dependence on critical common knowledge
assumptions is to resort to the stronger notion of dominant-strategy (DS hereafter) im-
plementation. DS mechanisms are simpler and thus practically more manageable1. How-
ever, being based on a stronger incentive compatibility concept, they may induce less
desirable achievements, as compared to BN mechanisms.
Following the Wilson Doctrine, the literature has identi￿ed circumstances under which
a DS mechanism exactly replicates the outcome that would arise with a BN mechanism
with regard to a rich variety of economic situations (within this domain of research,
recall Mookherjee and Reichelstein 1992, Segal 2003, Chung and Ely 2007, for instance).
Nonetheless, all existing studies focus on agency relationships in which agents display
systematic incentives to over/under-report private information to the principal. Hence,
the conclusions they achieve do not provide a clear clue about frameworks in which, by
contrast, agents may face countervailing incentives to misrepresent information.
That an agent may face countervailing incentives means that, in the words of Lewis
and Sappington (1989), he "may be tempted both to overstate and to understate his
private information, depending upon its speci￿c realization" (p.294). As Lewis and Sap-
pington (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) suggest, this may occur, for in-
stance, in regulator-￿rm relationships when the ￿rm/agent￿ s production technology is
such that the ￿xed cost depends negatively on the marginal cost, which is unknown to
the regulator/principal. So far contractual performance in the presence of countervailing
incentives has been explored with regard to single-agent environments2. Of course, in
the latter, no issue arises about the implementation notion to which the principal should
refer.
In this note we extend the analysis of contract design in the presence of countervail-
ing incentives to settings where the principal deals with two agents, each of whom may
display countervailing incentives. As we describe in section 1, our focus is on the speci￿c
case in which the information structure is binary, the privately known types are positively
correlated and the agents are protected by limited liability. Our contribution, to be pre-
sented in section 2 and 3, is twofold. We ￿rst evidence that, in the settings described
so far, there are circumstances under which, contrary to standard literature results, in-
formation correlation is valueless for the principal￿ s achievements. This occurs when the
presence of countervailing incentives relaxes the principal￿ s problem to the point that
1Alternatively, a principal could ask agents to report not only their own information, but also their
probability assessment about other agents￿private information. However, this would make the mecha-
nisms more complex. On the other hand, concerns about the principal￿ s ability to commit would arise
if, instead, the principal were to dictate herself beliefs to agents.
2Beside Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), to this domain of
literature belong Lewis and Sappington (1989b), Brainard and Martimort (1996) and Jullien (2000), for
instance.
1the ￿rst-best outcome would be e⁄ected even with a single agent (or with independent
types). Of course, under those circumstances, the implementation notion the principal
adopts does not matter, provided it does not a⁄ect the equilibrium outcome. We then
show that replacing the BN contract with a DS contract yields no penalty to the principal
also in the opposite case in which her programme is so constrained that most important
distortions are to be induced. By contrast, in this case, information correlation is useful
to the principal precisely because of the presence of tight constraints.
2 The two-type two-agent model
We consider a risk-neutral principal who contracts with two risk-neutral agents for
the provision of a good. The task of agent i = 1;2 is to provide qi units of the good.
Following Lewis and Sappington (1989), production costs are given by
Ci (qi;￿i) = ￿iqi + c(￿i): (1)
This means that agent i produces at marginal cost ￿i and bears a ￿xed cost c(￿i) that
depends negatively on the realization of ￿i: That is, high (low) ￿xed cost is associated
with low (high) variable unit cost.
At the contracting stage, agent i 2 f1;2g is privately informed about ￿i (his type).
It is commonly known that, 8i 2 f1;2g; ￿i 2 ￿ = f￿h;￿lg; with ￿h > ￿l; and that
c(￿l) = ch and c(￿h) = cl; with ch > cl: We denote ￿c = ch ￿ cl and ￿￿ = ￿h ￿ ￿l:
Prior beliefs are given by ￿fg = Pr(￿1 = ￿f;￿2 = ￿g); 8f;g 2 fh;lg; with ￿lh = ￿hl for
simplicity. The degree of type correlation is ￿ ￿ ￿ll￿hh ￿ ￿2
lh > 0:
Agents behave non-cooperatively. The principal ties them both in the o⁄er of a
unique grand-contract. Under the latter, agent i receives a transfer si for the production
of qi units of the good and obtains the pro￿t ￿i (qi;si) = si ￿ [￿iqi + c(￿i)]: Production
yields to the principal the gross bene￿t
P
i=1;2 V (qi); with V (0) = 0; V 0 > 0; V 00 < 0;
V 0 (0) = +1; V 0 (+1) = 0: The principal￿ s utility is given by the gross bene￿t net of
transfers, namely U (q1;q2;s1;s2) =
P
i=1;2 [V (qi) ￿ si]:
2.1 The principal￿ s programme
The Revelation Principle applies. The principal focuses on truthful direct revelation
mechanisms that include a lottery with two quantity-pro￿t pairs for each possible type,
namely (fqff;￿ffg;fqfg;￿fgg); with qff ￿ qi (￿f;￿f) and qfg ￿ qi (￿f;￿g) = qj (￿g;￿f);
8f 6= g 2 fh;lg; 8i 6= j 2 f1;2g; and similarly for pro￿ts. The speci￿c mechanism
to be chosen and, hence, the outcome to follow might depend on whether the principal
prefers to rest on a weaker or tighter concept of incentive compatibility. To allow for
both possibilities, we consider the two notions of BN and DS implementation.
2.1.1 Bayesian-Nash implementation
Suppose ￿rst that the principal wishes to induce truthtelling as a BN equilibrium.
Then, for each agent, reporting truthfully is to yield the highest expected payo⁄, given
his own type. De￿ne Pr(￿j = ￿f j￿i = ￿f ) = ￿ff=(￿ff + ￿fg); 8i 6= j 2 f1;2g; 8f 6= g 2
fh;lg; the (commonly known) posterior beliefs that agent i uses to evaluate his expected
payo⁄ when he has type ￿f: Further let ￿f ￿ ￿ff￿ff + ￿fg￿fg; 8f 6= g 2 fh;lg; the
2expected rent of an agent of type ￿f: The principal selects the mechanism that maximizes
her expected utility
b U = 2
X
f6=g
￿ff [V (qff) ￿ (cg + ￿fqff) ￿ ￿ff] + 2
X
f6=g
￿fg [V (qfg) ￿ (cg + ￿fqfg) ￿ ￿fg]
subject to the incentive constraints
IC
BN
l : ￿l ￿ ￿ll￿hl + ￿lh￿hh + ￿￿(￿llqhl + ￿lhqhh) ￿ ￿c(￿ll + ￿lh)
IC
BN
h : ￿h ￿ ￿lh￿ll + ￿hh￿lh ￿ ￿￿(￿lhqll + ￿hhqlh) + ￿c(￿lh + ￿hh);
the participation constraints
PCf : ￿f ￿ 0; 8f 2 fh;lg;
and the limited liability constraints
LLfg : ￿fg ￿ ￿m; 8f;g 2 fh;lg;
with 0 ￿ m < +1: For future reference, denote this programme P BN:
2.1.2 Dominant-strategy implementation
Suppose next that the principal wishes to induce truthtelling as a DS. Then, for each
type of either agent, reporting truthfully is to yield the highest payo⁄ for each possible
report of the other agent. The principal￿ s programme is analogous to P BN; except that
ICBN
l and ICBN
h are replaced by
IC
DS
ll : ￿ll ￿ ￿hl + ￿￿qhl ￿ ￿c
IC
DS
lh : ￿lh ￿ ￿hh + ￿￿qhh ￿ ￿c
IC
DS
hl : ￿hl ￿ ￿ll ￿ ￿￿qll + ￿c
IC
DS
hh : ￿hh ￿ ￿lh ￿ ￿￿qlh + ￿c:
Denote this programme P DS:
2.2 The ￿rst-best outcome
At the ￿rst-best outcome (FB hereafter), quantities are pinned down such that the








fg; f 6= g: Pro￿ts are set so as to leave no expected rent to agents:
￿
￿
f = 0; 8f 2 fh;lg: (4)
33 Results
An established result in the economic literature is that the principal bene￿ts from the
presence of a second agent who shares with the ￿rst agent, even only stochastically, some
information that is unknown to her. This is not necessarily the case in two-type settings
in which agents display countervailing incentives.
Proposition 1. As long as ￿c 2 [￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ]; FB is implemented even if the principal
faces a single agent (or two agents with independent types) so that correlated information
yields no bene￿t to the principal.
To state Proposition 1, one does not even need to solve P BN and P DS: It su¢ ces to
look at the situation in which the principal faces one sole agent who exhibits countervailing
incentives, which is a two-type version of the problem studied by Lewis and Sappington
(1989). As speci￿ed in Proposition 1, in the single-agent (or uncorrelated information)
setting with binary information structure, the optimal contract e⁄ects FB for all values
of ￿c that belong to the interval [￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ]3: Actually, for such values, any gain that
could be obtained by misreporting the value of ￿ would be o⁄set by an associated loss
in terms of ￿xed cost. Incentives to cheat are thus costlessly removed. Of course, this
outcome can always be replicated, for the same values of ￿c; in a correlated information
environment, even when agents are protected by limited liability. It follows that, under
these circumstances, the ability to contract with a second agent with correlated type
yields no bene￿t to the principal, contrary to standard literature ￿ndings.
Another established result in the literature is that, in correlated information settings,
a priori, BN implementation makes the principal weakly better o⁄ as compared to DS
implementation. This occurs because the former requires a weaker standard of incentive
compatibility. The principal thus enjoys a greater discretion at specifying payments and
can take a bigger advantage of type correlation. It follows that, with a BN mechanism,
the principal can (at least) replicate any outcome that she can achieve in DS. In the
speci￿c framework here explored, whether BN implementation brings an extra gain to
the principal depends on two elements, namely the value of m and that of ￿c.
The result that BN implementation makes the principal weakly better o⁄ carries
over as long as m is su¢ ciently large. In that case, limited liability constraints are not
binding and, whatever the value of ￿c; the principal can design a BN contract that
e⁄ects FB. Actually, this possibility is not speci￿c to environments characterized by the
presence of countervailing incentives. In a correlated information setting with systematic
incentives to over-report type, Gary-Bobo and Spiegel (2006) show that the principal can
recommend the e¢ cient production and extract surplus with an appropriate BN contract,
provided that liability is su¢ ciently large4. Analogous possibility is not at hand with a
DS contract. In the speci￿c situation we model, FB is implemented in DS thanks to the
presence of countervailing incentive, precisely as in single-agent frameworks.
A more interesting case arises when limited liability constraints are tight (m small).
Then, the peculiar nature of agents￿incentives imposes more structure on the optimal
3Details about the single-agent setting and the optimal single-agent contract are reported in Appendix
A. In particular, the case of FB implementation appears in PS
3 in Appendix A.2.
4In turn, this outcome rests on the classical ￿nding that FB is implemented in BN settings with
correlated information and no limited liability concerns (CrØmer and McLean 1988 and Riordan and
Sappington 1988).
4contract and thus a⁄ects the comparison between implementation concepts5.
Proposition 2. With m su¢ ciently small, BN implementation yields no additional
bene￿t to the principal as compared to DS implementation:
(i) whenever ￿c < ￿￿Qhl; with Qhl as pinned down in (5a) below, in which case the
optimal grand-contract entails:
(i=a) for type ￿h; surplus extraction and downward production distortions
V









(i=b) for type ￿l; e¢ cient production and information rent




(ii) whenever ￿c 2 [￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ]; in which case the optimal grand-contract e⁄ects
FB;
(iii) whenever ￿c > ￿￿Qlh; with Qlh as pinned down in (7b) below, in which case
the optimal grand-contract entails:
(iii=a) for type ￿l; surplus extraction and upward production distortions
V









(iii=b) for type ￿h; e¢ cient production and information rent




The circumstance that, in multi-agent environments with correlated types and limited
liability, FB is at hand for ￿c 2 [￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ] whether the principal resorts to BN or DS
implementation, follows directly from Proposition 1. Provided full e¢ ciency entails for
such values even with a single agent (or with two agents whose types are independent),
there is nothing more the principal can do in a correlated information setting. Therefore,
the possibility to better exploit type correlation with a BN mechanism is valueless to the
principal.
Proposition 2 further evidences that, as long as m is small enough, the optimal grand-
contract is robust to variations in the equilibrium concept not only when ￿c takes in-
termediate values, but also when it takes very small and very large values. Noticeably,
the latter are both situations in which it is particularly di¢ cult to induce truthtelling
because agents￿types display a clear incentive to misreport in one speci￿c direction. In-
deed, the gain that could be obtained by misrepresenting ￿ in that direction would more
5See Appendix B.1 and B.2 for a full presentation of the optimal BN and DS mechanism with m
small.
5than compensate the associated loss in terms of ￿xed cost. Speci￿cally, type ￿l is tempted
to over-report in situation (i); whereas type ￿h is tempted to under-report in situation
(iii): Under these circumstances, the principal faces a (nearly) standard adverse selection
problem, in which quantities are optimally distorted to decrease information rents6.
Figure 1 and 2 provide a graphical representation of the path that quantities follow
as ￿c takes di⁄erent values respectively in the optimal BN and DS grand-contract when
m is small. To better illustrate the content of Proposition 1, in Figure 1 the BN quantity
path (the black line) is contrasted with that in the optimal single-agent contract (the red
line). A comparison of the two graphs evidences that the BN quantities coincide with the
DS ones for very small, intermediate and very large values of ￿c; as previously pointed
out.
A neat message ensues from Proposition 2. In multi-agent environments with a binary
information structure and severe liability limits, tightening the equilibrium concept from
BN to DS yields no loss of generality to the principal as long as agents display either
su¢ ciently important countervailing incentives (case (ii)) or su¢ ciently strong systematic
incentives to misreport type (case (i) and (iii)):
This conclusion is no longer true for case (i) and (iii) if m is still su¢ ciently large
that, although FB is beyond reach for those values of ￿c; participation constraints are
binding. Then, in the optimal BN contract, quantities are distorted just enough to ensure
participation without compromising information release. That is, the principal takes for
case (i) and (iii) the same approach that she adopts for all the other values of ￿c for
which FB is not e⁄ected7. Noticeably, this approach is only at hand in environments
characterized by the presence of countervailing incentives. Under DS, even if agents can
be punished enough to remove all rents, the principal is compelled to pick one among the
allocations that are feasible in the BN framework. Speci￿cally, the optimal allocation is
such that distortions are contained in the quantities that are more likely to be assigned
(namely, with positive correlation, qhh and qll respectively). Yet, distortions remain
more important in the other quantities so as to warrant incentive compatibility. The
BN allocation is thus at least as e¢ cient as the DS allocation. The result that BN
implementation weakly dominates is restored.
4 Concluding remarks
Overall, our analysis predicts that, in correlated two-type settings where agents may
display countervailing incentives and are protected by limited liability, the optimal grand-
contract is robust to variations in the implementation notion (BN vs DS) both when
the principal￿ s programme is so relaxed that FB would be at hand even with a single
agent (or with two agents whose types are independent) and when it is so constrained
that the principal is to induce most important distortions. Actually, under both these
circumstances, the principal can run a mechanism that induces truthtelling in DS and
still secure the outcome that she would achieve with the BN optimal contract.
The lesson our study delivers appears to be useful with regard to situations in which
the principal is concerned with the robustness of the BN contract. This concern may
arise because BN incentive-compatible mechanisms may perform in unsatisfactory ways
6In situation (i) (resp. (iii)) the rent that type ￿l (resp. ￿h) obtains is decreased by distorting
downward (resp. upward) the quantities assigned to type ￿h (resp. ￿l).
7Check PBN
2 and PBN
4 in Appendix B.1.
6if the common knowledge assumptions on the agents￿posterior beliefs, on which they
critically rests, turn out to be incorrect8. Although restricted to the simplest possible
information structure, our investigation identi￿es circumstances under which the principal
can costlessly escape reliance on common knowledge assumptions in frameworks in which
agents display countervailing incentives to misreport type.
The observations made so far evidence a similarity between correlated information
contexts characterized by the presence of countervailing incentives and independent in-
formation contexts. Still referring to standard situations with systematic incentives to
over/under-report, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show that implementation in DS
entails no loss of generality, with respect to BN implementation, provided agents￿types
are independent.
The existence of this similarity with independent information settings should not con-
vey the idea that, in environments in which countervailing incentives arise and agents
are protected by limited liability, correlated information is equally (ir)relevant for the
principal whenever BN and DS achievements coincide (cases (i) to (iii) in Proposition
2). Because countervailing incentives tend to relax the principal￿ s programme, whereas
limited liability operates in the opposite direction, the role of correlation depends ulti-
mately on how intense those incentives are. Correlation is of no value as long as the
presence of countervailing incentives relaxes the principal￿ s programme to the point that
FB entails even if only small de￿cits can be imposed ex post (Proposition 1 and case (ii)
in Proposition 2). That is, su¢ ciently important countervailing incentives can work as
a substitute for correlated information. It is thus rather intuitive that correlated infor-
mation comes back to be useful when such incentives are not in place. Actually, it does
improve contractual performance as soon as systematic incentives to misreport prevail,
in which case the constraints the principal faces are especially severe (case (i) and (iii)
in Proposition 2)9.
8Compare, for instance, Chung and Ely (2007) who provide foundations for a principal to focus on
DS mechanisms whenever she is unwilling to make strong common knowledge hypotheses about agents￿
conjectures.
9To check this point it su¢ ces to compare the parts of the optimal BN and DS grand-contract
presented in the Proposition with PS
1 and PS
5 in Appendix A.2.
7Figure 1: Quantity path in the BN grand-contract with m small (black), as contrasted with that in the
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l +
￿m
￿ll￿lh; ￿ ￿ ￿￿Qll +
￿m
￿ll￿lh; & ￿ ￿￿Qlh:
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9A The single-agent environment
A.1 The principal￿ s programme
In the single-agent setting, in which type is ￿l and ￿h with probability ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿)
respectively, the principal picks the menu of contracts fqf;￿fg; 8f 2 fh;lg; that maxi-
mizes expected utility
U
S = ￿ [V (ql) ￿ (ch + ￿lql)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[V (qh) ￿ (cl + ￿hqh)] ￿ [￿￿l + (1 ￿ ￿)￿h]
subject to the agent￿ s incentive constraints
IC
S
l : ￿l ￿ ￿h + ￿￿qh ￿ ￿c
IC
S




f : ￿f ￿ 0; 8f 2 fh;lg:
Denote this programme P S:
A.2 The optimal contract




f) = ￿f (9a)
￿
￿
f = 0: (9b)
The contract ￿S that solves P S is characterized as in P S
1 ￿ P S
5 below.
P S
1 ) For ￿c 2 [0; ￿￿e qh); with e qh = qh as pinned down by (10a) below, ￿S entails
(9a) for f = l; (9b) for f = h and
V




￿l = ￿￿e qh ￿ ￿c: (10b)
P S
2 ) For ￿c 2 (￿￿e qh; ￿￿q￿






3 ) For ￿c 2 [￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ]; ￿S implements FB.
P S
4 ) For ￿c 2 (￿￿q￿
l ; ￿￿e ql); with e ql = ql as pinned down by (13a) below, ￿S entails






5 ) For ￿c > ￿￿e ql; ￿S entails (9a) for f = h; (9b) for f = l and
V




￿h = ￿c ￿ ￿￿e ql: (13b)
B The multi-agent environment
B.1 The Bayesian-Nash grand-contract (with m small)












￿hh(￿ll+￿lh); with Qhl and Qhh as pinned down
by (14a) below, ￿BN entails (3) for f = l; g = h; (4) for f = h and
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Pro￿ts are de￿ned as




















(3) for f = l; g = h; (4) 8f 2 fl;hg and









Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (15).
P BN










; ￿BN implements FB.
P BN














; with Qll and
Qlh as pinned down by (19a) below, ￿BN entails (3) for f = h; g = l; (4) 8f 2 fl;hg and













m; ￿lh = ￿m: (18)
P BN







￿ll(￿lh+￿hh); ￿BN entails (3) for f = h; g = l; (4)
for f = l and
V












11Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (18).
B.2 The dominant-strategy grand-contract (with m small)





1 ) For ￿c 2 [0;￿￿Qhl); ￿DS entails (3) for f = l; g = h; (14a), (4) for f = h and
(14b). Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (15) and as











; ￿DS entails (3) for f = l; g = h; (4) for




; qhh = Qhh (21a)




Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (15) and as














; ￿DS entails (3) for f = l; g = h;













Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (15) and as













; ￿DS entails (3) for f = l; g = h; (4) for




; qhh = q
￿
h: (25)
Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (15) and (24).
P DS
5 ) For ￿c 2 (￿￿q￿
h;￿￿q￿
l ); ￿DS implements FB.
P DS








; ￿DS entails (3) for f = h; g = l; (4) for
f = l;h and
qll = q
￿








m; ￿hh = ￿m: (27)
12P DS









; ￿DS entails (3) for f = h; g = l; (4)













Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (18) and (27).
P DS






; ￿DS entails (3) for f = h; g = l; (4) for
f = l and








Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (18) and as
￿hl = ￿c ￿ ￿￿Qll +
￿lh
￿ll
m; ￿hh = ￿m: (30)
P DS
9 ) For ￿c > ￿￿Qlh; ￿DS entails (19a), (3) for f = h; g = l; (4) for f = h and
(19b). Pro￿ts are de￿ned as in (18) and as
￿hl = ￿c ￿ ￿￿Qll +
￿lh
￿ll
m; ￿hh = ￿c ￿ ￿￿Qlh ￿ m: (31)
13